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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - LEGISLATIVE PowERs: TAXATION - EXEMPTION
OF FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITY FROM STATE TAXATION. -The defendant, a
private corporation, sold gasoline to the Federal Government for the use of
the Coast Guard and the Veterans' Hospital, and it did not include in the
purchase price the amount of the Mississippi privilege tax on all gasoline sales.
The state sued to recover these taxes, and demurred to the defendant's special
plea of exemption as a federal instrumentality. A judgment overruling the
demurrer was reversed by the supreme court of Mississippi. 147 Miss. 663,
112 So. 584 (1927). The defendant took a writ of error to the Supreme
Court. Held, that Mississippi may not tax any transaction by which the
United States secures materials desired for government purposes. Judgment
reversed. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 48 Sup. Ct. 451 (U. S. 1928).
A corporation is exempt from state taxation if its authorized function is
to serve the Federal Government. Clallamn County v. United States, 263 U. S.
341 (1923) (exclusive service); Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404 (1912)
(partial service). But it has repeatedly been held that a single contract with
the Federal Government is not sufficient to convert a private corporation into
a federal instrumentality exempt from state taxes. Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269
U. .S. 514 (1926); Baltimore Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375
(1904). It would seem that these decisions might be controlling in the prin-
cipal case. Exemption has been granted to corporations under no contract
with the Federal Government and only remotely affecting federal activities.
Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609 (1926) (mining corporation paying
royalties to Indian lessee). This class of cases is distinguishable, however, as
resulting from a strong governmental policy of protecting Indians in their
lease allotments, rather than a genuine attempt to protect a federal instru-
mentality. Shaw v. Gibson Zahniser Oil Corp., 48 Sup. Ct. 333 (U. S. 1928).
Moreover, even if the plaintiff is considered an operator of a governmental
agency, the basis of the rule of exemption must be examined. The test of the
validity of a state tax on a governmental agency should properly be whether
or not the tax effectively deprives such agency of its ability to serve the gov-
ernment. See Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 36 (U. S. 1873). It is
difficult to see why the United States should be a privileged purchaser, or how
any governmental function is interfered with by a tax applied indiscriminately
to all of the defendant's sales. Grayburg Oil Co. v. Texas, 3 S. W.(2d) 427
(Texas 1928).
CONTRACTS - OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE - REVOCATION OF AN OFFER TO A
UNILATERAL CONTRACT. - The defendant held a mortgage on the plaintiff's
property, which he offered to surrender if the plaintiff paid cash on or before
a certain date. The plaintiff entered into a contract to sell the land free
from the mortgage, and within the specified period he went to the defendant's
home and knocked on the door. In response to the defendant's inquiry, the
plaintiff replied: "It is I; I have come to pay off the mortgage." The de-
fendant thereupon informed him that the mortgage had been sold, but the
plaintiff nevertheless entered and tendered money which was refused. The
plaintiff sued for the difference between the amount which the defendant had
agreed to accept, and the amount necessary to clear the title. From a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. Held, that the defendant
had a right to revoke his offer at any time before the act requested as con-
sideration was performed. judgment reversed. Petterson v. Pattberg, 248
N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928).
Despite the general rule that an offer to a unilateral contract may be re-
voked at any time before complete performance, a few courts have held that
part performance by the offeree binds the offeror. Los Angeles Traction Co.
